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Abstract
Most companies relying on an Information Technology (IT) system for their
daily operations heavily invest in its maintenance. Tools that monitor network
traffic, record anomalies and keep track of the changes that occur in the system
are usually used. Root cause analysis and change impact analysis are two main
activities involved in the management of IT systems. Currently, there exists no
universal model to guide analysts while performing these activities. Although the
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) provides a guide to the or-
ganization and structure of the tools and processes used to manage IT systems, it
does not provide any models that can be used to implement the required features.
This thesis focuses on providing simple and effective models and processes for
root cause analysis and change impact analysis through mining useful artifacts
stored in a Configuration Management Database (CMDB). The CMDB contains
information about the different components in a system, called Configuration Items
(CIs), as well as the relationships between them. Change reports and incident
reports are also stored in a CMDB. The result of our work is the Decision support
for Root cause Analysis and Change impact Analysis (DRACA) framework which
suggests possible root cause(s) of a problem, as well as possible CIs involved in a
change set based on different proposed models. The contributions of this thesis are
as follows:
• An exploration of data repositories (CMDBs) that have not been previously
attempted in the mining software repositories research community.
• A causality model providing decision support for root cause analysis based
on this mined data.
• A process for mining historical change information to suggest CIs for future
change sets based on a ranking model. Support and confidence measures are
used to make the suggestions.
• Empirical results from applying the proposed change impact analysis process
to industrial data. Our results show that the change sets in the CMDB were
highly predictive, and that with a confidence threshold of 80% and a half
life of 12 months, an overall recall of 69.8% and a precision of 88.5% were
achieved.
• An overview of lessons learned from using a CMDB, and the observations we
made while working with the CMDB.
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Information Technology (IT) systems are the basis of most business services today.
Let us take a simple example of a photo printing service which allows customers to
buy its services online. Assume something goes wrong with their website which as
a consequence prevents customers from logging into their accounts. This in turn
prevents customers from uploading their photos for printing which might cause
them to divert to another company offering the same service. This situation could
result in a financial loss to the company. It is, therefore, essential to properly
manage such an IT system, and to quickly recover from any problem to minimize
financial losses as much as possible.
Two of the important activities of Enterprise IT Management (EITM) are root
cause analysis and change impact analysis. Root cause analysis is the process of
identifying the primary cause of a failure in a system. Quick and accurate root cause
analysis means spending less time in identifying the cause of a problem which results
in a shorter time to recovery. In practice, it is common to find that changes to an
IT system may cause unforeseen problems. It is, therefore, important to carefully
plan any change to the system, and to proactively identify all impacted items so
that they can be systematically changed according to the plan. Accordingly, change
impact analysis is the process of identifying all entities that will be impacted by a
change to avoid any unexpected consequences.
For example, if a security patch is to be installed on a server, analysts should
ensure that none of the applications hosted by this server will be negatively im-
pacted. This may occur if the security path prevents an application from accessing
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certain remote resources, for example. In this case, the set of entities to change,
i.e. the change set, will include not only the server, but all of the affected ap-
plications as well. In order to successfully implement a change without causing
costly disruptions to the system, the correct change set should be identified before
the change is implemented. Correctly planning changes in an IT system results in
a more maintainable system with fewer undetected errors. As the examples show,
change impact analysis is a proactive measure while root cause analysis is a reactive
measure. However, both processes seek to minimize undesirable IT disruption.
As IT companies become more aware of these needs, different tools and pro-
cesses are being developed to manage and monitor IT systems. For example, the
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) [25] has developed standards
that lay the foundation for service management, and outline the tools needed to
achieve it. Such tools include a Service Desk to manage incoming requests and
complaints, a Configuration Management Database (CMDB) to keep track of the
different components in the system and the relationships between them, network
monitoring tools etc.
A CMDB is used to store information about the various critical components in
a system including hardware, software, and services provided by the company. It
records information about these items, their change history, their incident history,
as well as the relationships between them. Each item stored in the CMDB is
referred to as a Configuration Item (CI). Thus, a CMDB serves as the repository
for important information about a system which can be used in decision making
processes such as root cause analysis and change impact analysis [25].
However, despite ITIL providing the standards of what (in precise) needs to
be tracked in an IT system, and the tools needed to track them, there are no
formalized models that explain how this tracked information can be used to provide
accurate root cause analysis and change impact analysis. Standardized models that
make use of the different gathered information to provide decision support for the
management of IT systems are therefore needed.
The work described in this dissertation was carried out in collaboration with CA
Labs Canada. CA is one of the providers of IT management tools such as Service
Desk and CMDB. Our collaboration with CA allowed us to contact its employees
and customers. We have been investigating CMDBs from the perspective of CA
CMDB experts, as well as from the perspective of three of CA customers who have
been using CMDBs. From our discussions, we have identified key usages of the
CMDB as well as missing features from the customers’ perspective. Our interviews
2
Figure 1.1: High Level Overview of the DRACA Framework
have confirmed that root cause analysis and change impact analysis are critical
processes in any large organization, and that more intelligent decision support for
these processes is needed.
1.2 Overview of Thesis
The work described in this dissertation seeks to provide semi-automated decision
support for root cause analysis and change impact analysis. To achieve these goals,
we must identify what information is needed to support these analyses, and how this
information can be extracted and modeled. Much like model-driven engineering and
model-driven development aim to provide platform-independent and technology-
independent architectural models [17], we aim to present generalized models that
can be used for root cause analysis and change impact analysis. As the processes and
tools that help manage IT systems mature, more research will be geared towards
developing such models for the usage of this information. These models should
identify the exact data needed to accomplish the specified goals, and how this data
will be used. The models should not be specific to a single type of repository, and
should be independent of the structure of the data. This thesis is a first attempt
at providing these models.
In this work, we present DRACA, a Decision support framework for Root cause
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Analysis and Change impact Analysis along with its underlying models. In this
work, we rely on the data available in a CMDB. However, the design of our presented
models and processes are independent of the structure of the data, and could easily
leverage other data sources. In this sense, our models provide a basis for what
information needs to be recorded in order to perform root cause analysis and change
impact analysis, but does not specify a specific format or process for recording this
data.
Figure 1.1 shows a high level overview of the DRACA framework. DRACA has
two underlying models: a causality model for root cause analysis, and a matrix-
based model with support and confidence measures for change impact analysis. In
our work, both the models are populated with data from the CMDB. However,
our models are not geared towards the structure of a particular CMDB. They are
applicable to other repositories as long as the information needed to populate our
models is stored there. Within each type of analysis, the data from the CMDB is
then processed and represented in the respective model to provide a quantitative
correlation between CIs. In root cause analysis, the model shows the probability
that CI x could be the root cause for CI y while in change impact analysis, the
model shows the probability that if CI x is changed, CI y might change as well.
When a CI encounters a problem, the root cause analysis process provides a
ranked list of possible root causes. When a change is proposed to a CI, the change
impact analysis process provides a ranked list of CIs that may be impacted by this
change and so might need to be changed as well. Although each process uses its
own models for analysis, both processes may collaborate together to confirm their
suggestions. For example, if a CI x is likely to be a root cause for a problem in CI
y then it may also likely that a change in CI x would induce a change in CI y or
vice versa.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
This work combines ideas from several research fields. To populate our models, we
mine the needed data from the CMDB. This is a largely unexplored topic within
the mining software repositories (MSR) field. Most of the work done in the MSR
community has been performed on repositories that store artifacts related directly
to software development, such as source code revisions and defect reports. Providing
results from system level repositories such as CMDBs is therefore a new contribution
to the research community.
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The models for root cause analysis and change impact analysis provided in this
thesis will lay the foundation for further models to be created, and for additional
sources of information to be added to provide better decision support for IT man-
agement. The field work performed in this thesis provides guidelines to the practical
needs of customers providing a link between research and the industry. Addition-
ally, DRACA is unique as it combines two important processes, root cause analysis
and change impact analysis, under one framework. The main contributions of this
work are:
• An exploration of data repositories (CMDBs) that have not been previously
attempted within the mining software repositories research community.
• A causality model providing decision-support for root cause analysis based
on this mined data.
• A process for mining historical change information to recommend CIs for fu-
ture change sets based on a ranking model. Support and confidence measures
are used to make the suggestions.
• Empirical results from applying the proposed change impact analysis process
to industrial data. Our results show that the change sets in the CMDB were
highly predictive, and that with a confidence threshold of 80% and a half
life of 12 months, an overall recall of 69.8% and a precision of 88.5% were
achieved.
• An overview of lessons learned from using a CMDB, and the observations we
made while working with the CMDB.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
concepts and definitions. This includes introducing ITIL, and explaining several
of its processes such as configuration management, change management and their
accompanying tools such as the Service Desk and the CMDB. This chapter also
a detailed overview of root cause analysis and change impact analysis. Chapter 3
then presents related research in the various fields our work combines. Chapter 4
presents the overall design of the DRACA framework. This chapter also describes
the industry interactions we had and the requirements we gathered from them.
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Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 present the core work of this thesis where Chapter 5
discusses the model used for root cause analysis, and Chapter 6 discusses the model
used for change impact analysis. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes this thesis while




This chapter presents background information about the concepts and tools used
in this work. Section 2.1 introduces the Information Technology Infrastructure Li-
brary (ITIL) along with some of its processes and tools. Section 2.2 then explains
terminology used in our models. Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 define root cause anal-
ysis and change impact analysis respectively. Section 2.5 defines causality graphs
as used in the context of this work.
2.1 Information Technology Infrastructure Library
(ITIL)
In our work, we concentrate on systems that generally follow ITIL [25], which is a
set of standards concerned with providing best practices for business effectiveness
and efficiency in the use of information systems. Since the mid 1990s, ITIL has
been recognized as the de facto standard for service management [25]. ITIL provides
general guidelines for a service management framework. It outlines the processes
needed such as Configuration Management and Change Management as well as the
ideal tools needed to accomplish these processes such as CMDBs, Service Desk,
security management tools etc.
2.1.1 Configuration Management
ITIL defines configuration management as “the process of identifying and defining
configuration items in a system, recording and reporting the status of configuration
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items and requests for change, and verifying the completeness and correctness of
configuration items” [25]. A configuration item (CI) is a component of an IT
infrastructure, such as a server or a software application, which is put under the
control of the configuration management process. CIs and their interrelationships
are modeled in the Configuration Management Database (CMDB). The level of
detail stored in a CMDB varies from one organization to another in scope and
granularity. For example, a computer can be represented as one CI, or it can be
represented as various CIs including the operating system used, the keyboard used
etc.
The goal of configuration management, apart from accounting for all IT assets
and their configuration, is to provide decision support for change management, in-
cident management, problem management, and release management [25]. These
processes depend on having the correct information stored in the CMDB. Accord-
ingly, the information in the CMDB should be accurate and the stored CIs and
their relationships should reflect the actual state of the system.
2.1.2 Change Management
Change management in ITIL is defined as “the process of controlling changes to the
infrastructure or any aspect of services, in a controlled manner, enabling approved
changes with minimal disruption” [25]. ITIL emphasizes the need to identify other
CIs that will be impacted whenever a change to a specific CI is proposed. Change
management is responsible for managing changes to both hardware and software
components. These changes may be a solution to a previous incident or problem,
or may be a proactive measure to reduce cost or improve performance.
2.1.3 Service Desk
The Service Desk is the interface employees and customers use to report any prob-
lems they face or to request changes [25]. The Service Desk is similar to the com-
monly known concept of a help desk. The main idea behind having a Service Desk
application is to have a single point of contact which receives all incoming requests.
Requests (incidents, problems, changes etc.) are then routed to the appropriate
teams.
Ideally, the Service Desk would have an underlying or integrated CMDB such
that when a request for a particular CI is received, analysts can easily view the
8
Figure 2.1: An IT System Stored in a CMDB
relationships this CI has to others. Additionally, it would allow viewing a CI’s
incident, problem and change history.
2.1.4 Configuration Management Databases (CMDB)
A Configuration Management Database (CMDB) is useful in Enterprise IT Manage-
ment (EITM) since it provides information about the various critical components
in a system including hardware, software, and services provided by the company.
It records the configuration of these items, their change history, their incident his-
tory, as well as the relationships between them. Each item stored in the CMDB is
referred to as a Configuration Item (CI). A CMDB usually provides visualization
capabilities to view the different CIs in the system and their inter-relations. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows an example CMDB to illustrate the concepts of CIs and relationships.
In this example, there are two software applications being hosted by two different
web servers. Both applications communicate with the same databases through a
load balancer. Such a visualization allows an IT analyst to better understand the
system at hand.
A CMDB provides a basis for decision making processes such as Incident Man-
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Figure 2.2: Role of a CMDB
agement, Change Management, etc. Figure 2.2 shows how a CMDB is central to
these processes [9].s More formally, Messineo and Ryder define seven fundamental
use cases of a CMDB [20]. These include impact analysis, root cause determina-
tion, change governance, auditing and compliance, resource optimization, services
mapping, and service performance planning.
2.2 Terminology: Faults, Failures, and Incidents
The terminology used in this work follows the ITIL standards [24]. A fault is a
design flaw or malfunction that causes a failure of one or more CIs. A failure, which
generally caused by a fault, is the loss of ability to operate to specification, or to
deliver the required output. A failure may cascade to cause more failures in other
CIs. A failure, or a failure cascade, may eventually cause an incident. An incident
is an event that is not part of the standard operation of a service and that may
cause an interruption to, or a reduction in, the quality of that service. An incident
is externally observable and is usually recorded in an incident report. Figure 2.3
illustrates these definitions.
It is worth noting that in the software engineering literature, the terms error,
10
Figure 2.3: Faults, Failures and Incidents in ITIL
Figure 2.4: Traditional Error Propagation
error latency, and fault latency have been commonly used in this context [3]. When
compared to the ITIL definitions described in the previous paragraph and in Fig-
ure 2.3, the difference between the traditional software engineering definitions and
ITIL definitions is the introduction of the term incident. We differentiate between
a failure and an incident in that a failure is not necessarily noticeable at a service
level to the user. In other words, an incident can be thought of as a service failure.
Figure 2.4 show the traditional cause effect relationships, especially in the fault
tolerance area of research, as presented by Avizienis et al.[3]. The error latency is
the time it takes for a fault to be activated and manifested as an error while the
error latency is the time it takes an error to propagate and become a failure.
2.3 Root Cause Analysis
A root cause is the underlying original fault leading to a particular incident. Root
cause analysis tries to map an incident to its underlying fault. For example, the
inability to view a certain web page is an incident. A failure associated with this
incident may be the inability to access the web server hosting the web page. The
root cause of the problem may be that someone changed the settings in the Domain
Name Server (DNS), and thus the web server is no longer reachable by that name.
In the literature, root cause analysis has also been commonly referred to as fault
localization, fault diagnosis, and fault identification [5, 16, 32].
2.4 Change Impact Analysis
A change is the addition, modification, or removal of anything that could affect on
IT services. A poorly planned change may lead to a fault in the system. Change
impact analysis tries to predict if a change will cause a fault which may lead to
11
Figure 2.5: Example Causality Graph
an incident. The concept of change impact analysis exists in different domains.
For example, in medicine, if the dosage of a certain medication is changed for a
patient, the doctor must determine if this will affect the required dosages of other
medications the patient is taking. For software systems, Arnold and Bohner [2] de-
fine software impact analysis as “the determination of potential effects to a subject
system resulting from a proposed software change”. This involves identifying which
other components will need to be changed.
2.5 Causality Graphs
A causality graph, records the cause and effect relations among different components
of a system. The nodes are the components, and edges are the relations. A causality
edge from x to y indicates that a problem in x could cause a problem in y. Thus,
a path on this graph shows a cause-effect chain. Causality graphs often model the
cause/effect strength of the relationships through probabilities. Figure 2.5 shows
a simple example of a causality graph. Here, an event in A can cause an effect in
B as well as an effect in C. The propagation of effect from A to B is independent
of that from A to C which means that the probability of the outgoing edges from
A do not have to add up to 1.0. As the graph in Figure 2.5 indicates, there is a
50% probability that a change or event in A would cause an effect on B, but only
a 20% chance that it will have an effect on C. As shown in Figure 2.5, in our
definition, the causality graph does not necessarily have to be a Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG) [8]. The edges must be directed, but the graph does not necessarily
have to be acyclic. As will be discussed in Section 5.5, our causality model does
account for cycles in the graph.
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2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented some of the key terminologies and tools that are
used in the remainder of this thesis. We defined Configuration Management since
accounting for all CIs and their relationships provides a basis for root cause analysis.
On the other hand, Change Management involves the process of change impact
analysis. We elaborated on the concept of CMDBs as they are used as a main
source of information in this work. The terminologies of faults, failures, incidents,
and change provide a basis for understanding root cause analysis and change impact
analysis as used in our framework. In this chapter, we have also defined causality
graphs as used in the context of the root cause analysis model presented in this
thesis. In the next chapter, we will present related research in the areas of root
cause analysis and change impact analysis. Some of the related research also uses





Root cause analysis and change impact analysis are problems that have existed for
some time. However, there are different levels at which these problems can be dealt
with, and these levels have drawn different amount of attention in the literature.
Root cause analysis and change impact analysis can be done at the source code
level, at the network level or at the service level. Since the different levels have
several commonalities, we present related work from all three types although our
work concentrates on the service level. Section 3.1 presents related root cause
analysis and change impact analysis work on the source code level. Section 3.2
then presents related work on the network level. Finally, Section 3.3 presents root
cause analysis and change impact analysis work done on a system or service level.
We concentrate more on presenting related work at this level as this is the focus of
our work.
3.1 Source Code Level
3.1.1 Root Cause Analysis
On the source code level, root cause analysis has been commonly known as de-
bugging or fault localization. When a piece of software fails, the developer usually
uses some form of debugging to identify the part of the code causing the problem.
Different debugging techniques have been proposed to provide faster methods of
isolating the fault. For example, Zeller [38] uses delta debugging to isolate the vari-
ables and values relevant to a failure. This process helps provide a cause-and-effect
chain leading to the observed erroneous behavior of the program. To be able to
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isolate the possible causes, an automated test, two comparable program runs and
access to the state of an executable program are required. Similarly, Renieris and
Reiss [30] provide fault localization by comparing faulty runs to a number of correct
runs to identify suspicious parts of the program that might be causing the failure.
However, their presented technique does not indicate which of the identified parts
might be more faulty than others.
From the perspective of mining software repositories, Ostrand and Weyuker [26]
mine information from defect tracking databases to predict fault-prone files. Nagap-
pan et al. [22] predict defects by constructing dependency graphs from the software
artifacts and using network analysis on these graphs. Zimmermann et al. [41] use
data from repositories such as CVS and Bugzilla to map bugs in the Eclipse project
to their responsible source code locations. This mapping is similar to mapping the
failure of an entity to its root cause (the incorrect source code in this case).
3.1.2 Change Impact Analysis
During the development and testing phases, many changes are done to the source
code. Since not every developer in the team has to be aware of the details of other
classes or components in the system, it is essential to identify the effects of a change
to avoid affecting other parts of the system that might depend on it. Work done
towards identifying other parts of the code that may potentially be affected by a
change includes that done by Badri et al. [4]. This work uses a control call graph
based technique to identify which methods might be affected by a change. A control
call graph shows the sequence in which calls get executed. It clarifies which calls
are conditional and which are not. Depending on where a change is going to be
made, the control call graphs can be used to trace other places in the code that
may be affected by this change.
Ying et al. [37] mine the change history from source code versioning systems
such as CVS repositories to predict related files such that when a developer changes
one file, a set of related files to consider can be recommended. This is done through
identifying changed files that were checked in during the same time frame and with
the same check in comment. The algorithm then extracts change patterns formed
from sets of changes that occur together frequently enough to form a pattern.
Similarly, Hassan et al. [15] also use data from CVS along with four main
heuristics to predict change sets, historical co-changes being one of them. They
use pruning techniques to improve the recall and precision values while combining
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their proposed heuristics in different ways. Without pruning, the heuristics pro-
duced high recall values, but very low precision values. With a hybrid technique
that combines historical co-changes with file structure information and pruning, an
average recall of 0.51 and an average precision of 0.49 was achieved.
On the same note, Zimmermann et al. [42] present their tool, ROSE, which
guides programmers during the change process of updating source code by suggest-
ing other program entities that previous programmers have changed in the same
situation. This is done by mining the CVS repository to discover which program
entities were changed together. Rules are then produced based on the entities that
change together frequently, and are assigned a support and confidence level de-
scribed in [40]. The authors looked at eight different systems including Eclipse,
GCC, JEdit, and KOffice. Their results show that for stable systems like GCC,
ROSE obtained a precision of 0.44 and a recall of 0.28. Other probabilistic tech-
niques to model historical co-changes include using Bayesian Belief Networks [27]
such as the work done by Mirarab et al. [21]. However, in our work, we chose to
use the support and confidence measures defined by Zimmermann et al. [40] in our
change impact analysis process. Section 6.4 explains these measures in detail.
In related work, Canfora et al. [7] predict change sets by mining textual descrip-
tions of change requests rather than considering entities that changed at the same
time only. That is, when a change request is received, related change requests are
retrieved based on the similarity of the textual descriptions of both reports, and
accordingly, the changed files in the retrieved reports are recommended according
to the rankings.
This type of work is relevant because the same ideas are applicable on a service
or system level. Instead of recording changes that have been done to a source code
file, a CMDB records changes that are done to the configuration of CIs. By looking
at change reports, and seeing which CIs changed together often, we can recommend
a set of CIs to check when changing a certain CI just as a set of files is recommended
when one file is changed.
3.2 Network Level
3.2.1 Root Cause Analysis
Decision trees have often been used in failure diagnosis to locate the faults in a
network. Chen et al. [39] first train a decision tree to identify failed and successful
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requests in a network through request logs, and then post-process the tree to remove
irrelevant paths according to a set of heuristics. They apply their technique to the
eBay network for several months, and obtain promising results. This work, however,
concentrates on Internet sites, and would be hard to apply to large systems of
different nature. In their work, the authors assume the presence of the initial tree,
and do not explore the problem of acquiring this data. However, obtaining different
possible paths for the different events in a system is not an easy task.
Lewis presents a case-based approach to managing faults in communication
networks [19]. His work assumes that all problems in a network have filed trouble
tickets associated with them. Trouble tickets contain fields such as the alarm that
went off, the date and time of the problem, the problem device, the kind of trouble,
history of the problem, possible cause, and finally, the resolution to the problem.
When a new trouble ticket comes in, related trouble tickets will be retrieved from
the trouble ticket repository, and the closest trouble ticket would be used. The
closest trouble ticket is based on the number of matching fields between the two
trouble tickets. The strategy or solution of the chosen trouble ticket is applied. If
it does not work, then the strategy of the next matching ticket will be applied and
so on.
3.2.2 Change Impact Analysis
Hariri et al. [14] developed a framework for identifying the impacts of faults and
attacks in large scale networks. Although the studied feature here is not a planned
change, it still follows the same idea of proactively determining the impact of some
event. In this case, the event is an anticipated attack on the network such as a
denial of service attack, for example. The developed framework identifies critical
parts of the system whose failure would severely impact all the system’s behavior
due to this attack.
3.3 Service/System Level
Service Management is gaining the interest of many researchers as it is a current
problem faced by most companies. IT managers need tools to help them manage
their services and to ensure they meet their specified Service Level Agreement
(SLA). Researchers have been trying to devise with practical solutions that help IT
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personnel quickly diagnose problems (root cause analysis) and proactively discover
the impact of a change before applying it (change impact analysis).
3.3.1 Root Cause Analysis
When incidents or failures are reported, they are usually reported in terms of a
service not working properly such as the email service being too slow, for example.
To resolve the incident, a mapping of this high level observation to the resource
causing the problem should be made. Hanemann [12] developed a framework for
fault diagnosis based on service related events. The main idea behind this work is
that concepts from the fault diagnosis literature should be adapted to work with
service oriented fault localization. In most IT systems, incidents are received at
the level of the services in the form of performance degradations, SLA breaches,
or total failures. Hanemann proposes an event correlation framework to correlate
between events received at the service level and those received at the resource level
in order to identify the root cause of any problem with a service.
Hanemann [11] proposes a hybrid approach for resolving service failures which
combines rule-based and case-based reasoning. Rules which map service events to
their possible root causes on the resource level will be stored in a rule database.
When an incident is received, the appropriate rule is chosen from the database. If
no such rule exists, then control is turned to the case-based reasoner which tries
to match this event to previous cases. If no match is found (i.e this is the first
time such an incident is received), the root cause of the problem will be manually
identified and then stored as a case in the case database. Eventually, the rule-
based reasoner is updated to deal with such cases after they have been resolved
by the case-based reasoner. The downside to this approach is that it is difficult to
identify all the needed rules, and manually resolving each case might be very costly.
Additionally, having static rules that do not examine the actual events that took
place in the system can often lead to identifying the wrong root cause.
Wang et al. [35] propose a knowledge engineering framework for service man-
agement based on a Bayesian Network. Their proposed framework is based on
data from operation management tools, event log files, CMDB, and other resource
information. They have based their work on IBM Change and Configuration Man-
agement Database (CCMDB) which had more than 1000 kinds of CIs and 86 kinds
of relationships. They used expert knowledge to build the required Bayesian Net-
work based on the type of nodes and the relationships between them.
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To use the model, the technician would enter the observations that can be made
about the system, and the network would produce a list of ranked CIs according to
their probability of being true. This is done by calculating the probability of each
node in the graph being true considering the observations made. Accordingly, the
technician could know which CIs to check to solve the current problem. Their work
shows that the top two ranked CIs are usually enough to use to solve the problem.
Although the authors clarify how they would identify the causality edges in the
Bayesian Network (through templates produced by experts), they do not clarify
how they extract the prior and conditional probabilities for the network. They
mention that they will use history records and expert knowledge, but they do not
explain how exactly would that be done. In our work, we also use more information,
such as temporal constraints to produce more accurate root cause analysis.
Log files have also been an important source of information for discovering
errors or violation of system requirements. Wang et al. [36] use logs to monitor the
behavior of a system. They present a solution based on propositional satisfiability
(SAT) to diagnose software requirements. The first step is to construct a goal
model to represent the correct behavior of the system. This correct behavior is
defined by the requirements the system should fulfill, and each main goal would be
divided into subgoals. The system is then instrumented at the parts that show the
different monitored goals in the constructed model. Therefore, log files would show
whether these goals were accomplished successfully or if there were any problems.
The goal model is then turned into a SAT formula. The values for the variables in
the SAT formula are obtained from examining the log files which show if a goal has
been achieved (i.e., has a true value) or not (i.e., has a false value). The different
combinations of diagnoses for the wrong behavior of a system are predefined, and
the SAT solver is repeatedly invoked to find an assignment that corresponds to all
possible diagnoses.
Wang et al. [36] are the first to propose a SAT-based solution. However, there
are two main drawbacks to its practicality. For example, the source code has to
be instrumented in order to get the needed information into the log files. This
is a big overhead especially if there is no access to the source code, and service
level management should not have to go down to the source code level. Addition-
ally, identifying all the combinations of events that violate a requirement is very
challenging. In practice, many problems come from unforeseen circumstances. This
solution would not identify these scenarios. Similarly, Razavi and Kontogiannis [28]
use log analysis as well to determine if a specific undesired scenario has occurred.
They use threat tree models to represent an undesired or threatening pattern, and
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then use pattern matching to identify whether the events in the system map to this
pattern or not. Again, it is very challenging to identify all variations of possible
threats in order to model them in a threat tree. Other work analyzing logs includes
that by Reidemeister et al. [29] who use machine learning techniques to recognize
symptoms of recurrent faults from log data.
Since static information is not always enough, considering temporal issues is
one of the challenges we address in our work. In [33], Tawfik and Neufeld discuss
various techniques for considering temporal information while modeling causality.
They augment regular Bayesian Networks with temporal information by adding
time to the Conditional Probability Table (CPT). Instead of having a CPT for each
random variable (RV) in the graph, they represent the conditional probabilities as
continuous functions with respect to time. This allows the model to answer the
question of what is happening at time t. More precisely, it allows them to find
the probability of X happening at time t given event Y . This method, however,
requires the network to keep track of each node’s value over time and the time at
which any particular observation is made which may not be very practical [6].
Temporal issues provide many challenges especially in dynamically changing
networks that do not have a static infrastructure. Natu and Sethi [23] provide a
way to deal with this dynamic aspect of the networks in order to determine the
root cause of problems. Their model stores relationships between faults and their
possible symptoms. This is done through a matrix where rows represent observable
symptoms and columns represent the possible network faults. If a symptom is
correlated with a fault, an entry in the matrix mapping this fault to this symptom
would be present. This entry would be a probability value indicating the strength
of the relationship.
The algorithm used to identify root causes analyzes symptoms one at a time. A
hypothesis is drawn with the first symptom and then updated with each upcoming
symptom until a final hypothesis is reached. To incorporate temporal information,
the model is updated at regular increments of time, and is time stamped with the
time it was formed. Additionally, the symptoms are also time stamped. During
analysis the time of the symptom is compared with that at which the model was
constructed. The difference between the symptom time and the time at which the
model was constructed affects the confidence of the derived hypothesis. The closer
the two times, the more confidence there is in the hypothesis. Therefore, each time
stamp will have a dependency matrix associated with it. Hypothesis are also stored
and time-stamped to be used in later calculations. Old hypothesis or matrices are
removed once the information becomes irrelevant because it is very outdated.
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Our root cause analysis model also uses a matrix to store the probabilities tied to
edges representing causal implications between problems and their possible reasons.
Natu and Sethi refer to them as faults and symptoms. The first difference is that
in our matrix, the rows and columns are the same set of CIs as any CI may have
an incident and any CI could be a possible root cause. We do not divide them into
separate sets of faults and symptoms.
Additionally, the main issues their work addresses differs from ours. They ad-
dress wireless ad-hoc systems where nodes are continually changing. In our work,
the nodes themselves are fairly stable and so this is not a significant concern for
us.However,the change in the edges between the nodes is a concern for us i.e., if they
exist at certain times or not. A common concern both techniques have, however, is
the time of analysis, and thus the best model (stored matrix) is used according to
the time of the incident.
3.3.2 Change Impact Analysis
At the system level, where services are involved, change impact analysis must iden-
tify the effect of a change of any component or service in the system on other
components as well as other services in the system. Kumar et al. [18] present an
enterprise ontology that overlays the data in a CMDB which helps in identifying
and quantifying the impact of changes. This work attempts to account for the
dynamic aspect of IT systems as well as quantifying the change impact. Addition-
ally, they also incorporate impact of changes on service provision; this has become
an important feature of modern Enterprise IT Management (EITM). The model
assumes four types of entities that are mapped on top of CMDB CIs. These are:
infrastructure components, which are physical resources; service components, which
run on the infrastructure components; process transactions, which are abstractions
that represent end-to-end business processes executed by the service components;
and business goals, which are delivered through the process transactions. The au-
thors define a set of attributes for each entity. These attributes and the relationship
between the different components allows the quantification of the requirements of
a component to run correctly in terms of the other components. Four use cases
of a medical example are presented to show how the impact of a change can be
determined based on their defined attributes.
Similarly, Boer et al. [10] propose an ontology of enterprise architectures in
order to analyze the impact of changes in a system. By defining relationships in an
ontology, and using their semantic meanings to determine the effect of a change,
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impact analysis can be performed on enterprise systems. They use ArchiMate [1], an
enterprise architecture modeling language, as the basis to define heuristic rules for
determining the effects of different types of changes based on the semantic meanings
of the relationships. ArchiMate consists of structural and behavioral concepts that
are used to model a system. Boer et al. use some of these concepts such as role,
component, data model, trigger, process and service. The main relationships used
to relate concepts are use, assign, realize, access, and trigger.
Heuristic rules are then defined for each of these relationships. For example,
the access relationship that models a behavioral concept A accessing a data object
B. The heuristics defined include that if A is deleted, B is not affected, while a
modification of A might involve a new way of accessing B. Another heuristic based
on the use relationship is that if B uses A, then a modification in A might involve
a need to modify B so that it can still use the same functionalities it depends
on in A. Based on such heuristics, the ripple effect of a change is calculated by
calculating the immediate impact of a change from one concept to other directly
related concepts, and then repeatedly finding the effect on the newly discovered
impact to directly related concepts and so on until there are no more new impacts
discovered.
It is important to distinguish between failure impact analysis and change impact
analysis. For example, [13] presents a framework for failure impact analysis to
determine the impact of a failure in order to determine the best course of action
to be taken. This is dependent on the degree of violation to the service level
agreements in place. Change impact analysis, on the other hand, concentrates on
predicting the impact of a change before implementing it.
The above presented related work shows different approaches for change impact
analysis on the system or service level. However, there is no work, to the best of
our knowledge, that applies data mining techniques on a CMDB and uses historical
data to predict change propagation on the system level.
3.4 Summary
This chapter presented related research in the fields of root cause analysis and
change impact analysis. Work in these fields is done at three different levels: source
code level, network level, system and service level. On the source code level, version
control systems such as CVS and bug tracking systems such as Bugzilla have been
mined to extract fault prone files and co-changes of source code files. On the
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network level, fault trees have been used to identify the causes of problems in a
network. More related research has been provided at the service level as this is the
focus of this thesis. On the service level, root cause analysis has been done through
log analysis, Bayesian networks as well as rule-based and case-based reasoning of
previous faults. Change impact analysis has been done by defining ontologies for the
relationships between system components. Our work combines different features of
root cause analysis and change impact analysis into one framework, and augments
the analysis with temporal information which allows for a more dynamic analysis.
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Chapter 4
Overview of DRACA Framework
In order to define the requirements needed for the Decision Support for Root cause
Analysis and Change impact Analysis (DRACA) framework, and to identify pos-
sible sources of information, we held interviews and discussions with CA analysts
and CA customers. This chapter presents the important points that arose from
our discussions which lay the foundations of the features presented by DRACA.
Section 4.1 presents these discussions. Section 4.2 then gives a black-box overview
of DRACA’s two processes.
4.1 Field Work
We were able to contact three CA customers who use a CMDB. Two of these
customers use CA’s CMDB, while the third was using an in-house CMDB and con-
sidering buying CA’s CMDB. Additionally, we also conducted several discussions
with CA’s Global Information Systems (GIS) team who manages CA’s IT systems.
To do so, they use CA’s CMDB and other CA tools as well.
The goal of our discussions was to better understand the needs associated with
managing a large IT system providing different services to its clients. We wanted
to understand why a CMDB is useful to them, and how they use it. Additionally,
we looked for deficiencies in the functionalities offered by the CMDB which we can
ameliorate in our framework.
Most of our interviewees saw many benefits to the CMDB in terms of organizing
the information about their system, and keeping track of their CIs. They all used
the CMDB for root cause analysis and change impact analysis. From our discus-
sions, we got real life examples of changes such as modifying the configuration of a
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firewall which sometimes causes some applications to fail if any dependencies were
missed. Another example given was that an application depended on two databases
one running Oracle and the other running SQL Server. If the Oracle database was
upgraded, for example, then they must make sure that the new version of Oracle
is still compatible with the SQL Server.
Given an initial CI to change, analysts commonly follow the relationship edges
stored in the CMDB to determine a list of other CIs that may be impacted. How-
ever, apart from getting a list of the CIs that might be impacted, no additional
information — such as ranking or some quantification of this impact — is provided
to them. Our interviewees indicated that they would like to get more details about
what the impact of a change is, and which CIs are more likely to be impacted than
others.
When asked how they perform root cause analysis, those using CA’s CMDB
indicated that they look at the dependency edges to find all related CIs, and then
check the status of each. They indicated that it would be useful to have a more
automated way of discovering the root cause of a problem. From the manual steps
indicated by the other customer using its home-grown CMDB, we were able to
identify some key points that need to be included in root cause analysis. When a
problem occurs, IT analysts go back and check any change or event that occurred
in the last 48 hours to narrow down their suspect CIs. We consider this point in
our automated root cause analysis since events or changes that are closer in time
to the time of a problem are more likely to be its cause.
Another significant point that arose in our discussions is that of temporal con-
straints on the relationships in an IT system. That is, some relationships only exist
at certain times. These are usually scheduled events such as build processes or
backup processes that only occur at specified times in the calendar of a system.
The fact that these relationships do not exist at all times should be taken into
consideration while performing both root cause analysis and change impact analy-
sis. All of the points raised in our discussions were taken into consideration when
designing DRACA.
4.2 DRACA: The Big Picture
The DRACA framework consists of two main processes: root cause analysis and
change impact analysis. Figure 4.1 shows the overall structure of DRACA from a
black-box perspective. The root cause analysis process constructs its model from
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the DRACA Framework
the CIs and their relationships, incident and problem reports, CI change history,
and calendar information. Chapter 5 gives the details of how this information is
used. When an incident or problem is encountered, the incident or problem report
is provided to DRACA such that DRACA knows the affected CI as well as the time
of the incident. Using this information and its stored model, DRACA provides a
ranked list of suspect root causes of this incident.
On the other hand, the change impact analysis process constructs its model
from historical co-changes by analyzing previous change orders. It also needs to
identify the CIs in the system, and thus uses the stored CI information. When an
analyst decides she wants to change a specific CI, she provides this CI to DRACA.
DRACA then produces a ranked list of other CIs that should be considered for
inclusion in the analyst’s current change set. Chapter 6 provides the details of this
process.
Table 4.1 compares the root cause analysis process and the change impact anal-
ysis process. For root cause analysis, the input is the CI for which the incident is
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Root Cause Analysis Change Impact Analysis
Input Problematic CI/Observed In-
cident.
Proposed Change to a CI.
Output Ranked list of suspect CIs
(least number of possible CIs).
Must be accurate.
Ranked list of possibly affected




Look at what incident CI de-
pends on.
Look at historical co-changes
Ranking Rank results according to a
suspect rate (probability), usu-
ally based on history.
Rank results according to con-
fidence based on history
Learning Learning from past incidents
and previous root cause anal-
ysis results.
Learning from past change or-
ders and previous change im-
pact analysis results.
Time Have to consider time of in-
cident and time of previous
events.
Have to consider time of anal-
ysis and the time of previous
change sets.
Table 4.1: A comparison between Root Cause Analysis and Change Impact Analysis
observed; for change impact analysis, the input is the CI the analyst would like to
change. The output of both processes is a ranked list of CIs. For root cause analy-
sis, this is the list of possible suspect root causes while for change impact analysis,
this list is the set of CIs that may also need to be included in the analyst’s change
set for the change to be complete. Root cause analysis considers the dependencies
stored in the CMDB in order to determine the relation between CIs while change
impact analysis looks at the historical co-changes of CIs in order to determine the
relation between them. In both root cause analysis and change impact analysis, the
ranking is done according to a probabilistic measure although how this measure is
estimated differs between both processes. Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 discuss how
these probabilities are mined in more details. Additionally, both processes have
a learning aspect to them since new change orders or incident/problem reports
get stored back into the CMDB. Accordingly, when the model is updated, this
new knowledge will be incorporated in it. Finally, temporal information should be
considered in both processes. In the root cause analysis process, the time of the
incident as well as the calendar information of the CI relationships is considered.
In change impact analysis, older co-changes have less potential relevance to future
changes, which is reflected through exponential forgetting.
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4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented an overview of the DRACA framework in terms
of the inputs and outputs of both the root cause analysis process and the change
impact analysis process. The field work performed to extract the functionalities
needed in each process was also presented in this chapter. Through the discussions
conducted, we identified the key required functionalities which in turn specified the
information needed to provide them. The next two chapters discuss each of the





DRACA’s Root Cause Analysis
Process
This chapter presents the root cause analysis process and the underlying root cause
analysis model included in DRACA. Before going into the details of the process,
and its underlying model, we first define the sources of data needed for this model.
Although we collect this data from a CMDB, our model does not depend on any
specific format, which makes it general enough to be used with any IT system. The
needed information is presented in Section 5.1.
The root cause analysis part of DRACA consists of three steps that are shown
in Figure 5.1. The remaining sections of this chapter explain each of these steps in
details. Section 5.2 presents Step 1 which produces a root cause matrix based on
the CIs and their relationships in the CMDB and a defined relationship mapping
scheme. Section 5.3 then discusses Step 2 which examines the calendar information
of the system and correlates it with the time of the current incident to produce
a root cause matrix that matches this time. Section 5.4 presents the last step,
Step 3, which considers the change history of CIs to weigh each one according to
its last time of change. Changes closer to the time of the incident will get higher
weights. This step produces the current weighted root cause matrix which shows the
probability of each CI being a root cause of the current incident. Based on these
probabilities, a ranked list of suspect CIs can be produced. Finally, Section 5.5
discusses some of the accuracy and effectiveness of DRACA’s root cause analysis
process.
31
Figure 5.1: DRACA’s Root Cause Analysis Process
5.1 Data Needed for Root Cause Analysis
In order to populate the causality model we use for root cause analysis, the following
data should be available:
• CIs and Relationships: A record of which CIs are in the system, and the
relationships between them is. A list of all possible types of relationships is
also needed to be able to produce the relationship mapping scheme.
• Incident and Problem Reports: Reports must record the affected CI as
well as the cause of the incident or problem. Additionally, these reports must
be time-stamped.
• Change history of CIs: Any changes to a CI or events associated with it
must be tracked.
• Calendar Information: All scheduled tasks must be recorded to be able to
determine what CIs and relationships are active at any point in time.
5.2 Step 1: Producing the Root Cause Matrix
The root cause matrix is produced in three sub-steps. Step 1a produces the causality
graph by mapping the CIs in the CMDB into nodes, and mapping the CMDB
relationships into causality edges according to a defined mapping scheme. Step
1b attaches probabilities to the causality edges by mining incident reports, change
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Figure 5.2: Example IT System in a CMDB
reports, and expert knowledge. Step 1c stores these probabilities in a causality
matrix K and calculates the probability that each CI could be the root cause of
another CI. This probability will be stored in the root cause matrix R.
Step 1a: Mapping CMDB Relationships into Causality Edges
The data available in a CMDB records how different CIs interact together. Fig-
ure 5.2 shows a small example system stored in a CMDB. The CIs in the graph have
been numbered in order to simplify reference to them in the rest of this chapter.
Based on these relationship meanings, we develop a mapping into causality edges.
For example, in Figure 5.2, Application 2 connects to the Oracle database, so if the
Oracle database has any problem, Application 2 will malfunction because it can no
longer fetch data from the database correctly. In other words, a problem in Oracle
can cause a problem in Application 2. In a causality graph, this would map to an
edge going from Oracle (node 4) to Application 2 (node 2). To achieve this, we
develop a mapping scheme to convert the different relationships in the CMDB into
causality relationships. Table 5.1 shows the scheme we use to map the CMDB in
Figure 5.2 to the causality graph shown in Figure 5.3.
In a real system, there would be more relationships defined in a CMDB. Ad-
ditionally, as time passes, CMDB managers may add new types of relationships
to meet their needs. In such a case, they should enhance the mapping scheme to
include the new relationships.
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CMDB Relationship Causality Mapping
A hosts B A causes B
A connects to B B causes A
A backs up B A causes B
A uses B B causes A
Table 5.1: CMDB Relationship Mapping Scheme
Step 1b: Estimating the Probabilities
Given the causality edges calculated in step 1a, step 1b estimates the probabilities
on these edges. Estimating the strength of the causality edges, which we represent
as probabilities, is one of the most challenging parts of root cause analysis. This is
done by mining the incident reports that were prepared for previous incidents. The
reports will contain information about the root cause of the incident, and how it was
solved. Additionally, some incident reports may contain information about other
related failures or symptoms that occurred concurrently with this incident. This is
useful in estimating the probability on the edges. Simple counting techniques such
as how many times CI x had a reported incident (count(x )) and how many times
CI y was the cause of this incident (count(y → x )) can give us an estimate for the
strength of the relation between y and x in the form of count(y → x )/count(x ).
Change reports are another source of relevant information. When a change is
to be implemented, related CIs that need to be checked and other changes that
need to be implemented as a result are usually documented. The same counting
technique can be used to estimate the strength of the relationship between two CIs.
If two CIs commonly change together, then there is a greater chance that these CIs
are related and that a fault in one can cause a failure in the other. In DRACA, this
information is stored in the change impact analysis model allowing the root cause
analysis process to leverage it.
Finally, expert knowledge is an important source of information. If the above in-
formation is not well documented, experts who have been working with the system
for years could provide an estimate for it as they have extensive knowledge about
the things that go wrong, and their most likely root causes. We use these sources
of information to estimate the probabilities shown in Figure 5.3. Ideally, incident
reports and problem reports would be used to estimate the probabilities, and ex-
perts would verify this information or provide additional information when proper
documentation is missing. However, the amount of reliance on expert knowledge
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Figure 5.3: Example Causality Graph Corresponding to Figure 5.2
greatly depends on the quality of historical information present.
Apart from estimating the strength of causality edges, we must also estimate
how prone a CI is to having a fault. For example, some servers are more prone to
failure than others. This could be because the hardware used is more faulty for
example. On the other hand, some applications may fail more often than others
because they have not been vigorously tested. We, therefore, need a measure of
how prone a CI is to having a fault of its own accord. That is, without being a
consequence of a fault in another CI. We call this measure fault proneness. We
define the fault proneness fi of a node i as the probability that i has a fault of its
own accord. For example, f1 = 0.4 means that there is a 40% chance that node
1 might incur a fault based on its behavior in the past. fi is also mined out of
historical incident and problem reports by showing the percentage of time a CI had
an incident out of the total number of incidents reported in the system.
Figure 5.3 shows the corresponding causality graph for the example in Fig-
ure 5.2. It shows the probability on the causality edges as well as the fault prone-
ness of every CI. For example, in Figure 5.3 the probability on the edge from node
1 to node 2, K12 = 0.4 shows that if there is a fault or failure in node 1, there
is a 40% chance that it will cause a failure in node 2. We assume that the prop-
agation of errors along a node’s outgoing edges are independent events, and are
not mutually exclusive. This means that an error in one node can simultaneously
propagate along more than one edge that leaves from that node. Accordingly, the
probabilities on the edges coming out of a node do not have to add up to 1.0. For
example, probabilities on the edges propagating out from node 4 (0.6 and 0.9) add
up to 1.5, and not to 1.0.
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Step 1c: Calculating Root Cause
Steps 1a and 1b produce the causality graph that we use to produce the root cause
matrix. In order to do this, we first store this causality graph in a matrix K. Given
a causality graph with n nodes, the edges in the graph which represent a direct
causal relation between two nodes will be stored in the n by n matrix K. The
probability that CI i might directly cause a problem in CI j is found in the entry




0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.6 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0

Representing this information in a matrix provides a convenient way for cal-
culating indirect cause propagation. An entry Kij is the probability of an error
propagating from i to j through a direct edge (i.e a path of length one). Now,
consider K2, which is the square of K, i.e., K multiplied by K. Entry K2ij is the
probability of propagating from i to j through any path of length two. In order to
calculate this probability, we must consider all paths of length two from i to j and
assume we take any, some or all of them. This probability is calculated by finding
the probability of taking any of the possible two-step paths from i to j according
to the following probability rule where A and B are independent events:
P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A) ∗ P (B) (5.1)
We use this probability rule when multiplying the matrices and when adding
them to compute the transitive closure matrix.
Let us consider the graph in Figure 5.3, and consider the ways a problem in
node 5 can propagate to affect node 2. To start with, K52 = 0 since there is no
path of length one from node 5 to 2. Now, to calculate K252, we need to consider
going from node 5 to node 2 in any path of length two. Only one such path exists
in our graph: 5→ 4→ 2. Therefore, K252 is calculated as follows:
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K252 = K54 ∗K42
= 0.2 ∗ 0.9
= 0.18
Similarly, K352 is calculated through the path 5→ 4→ 1→ 2 as follows:
K352 = K54 ∗K41 ∗K12
= 0.2 ∗ 0.6 ∗ 0.4
= 0.048
When we calculate the probability of taking any path leading from i to j in
one step (Kij), or two steps (K
2
ij), or three steps (K
3
ij), or ... , or ∞ steps (K∞ij ),
we will get the overall probability that an error or failure in i could propagate to
j through a path of any length. In other words, we are computing the transitive
closure of matrix K which we shall call T :
Tij = ∪∞l=1K lij (5.2)
For simplicity and illustration purposes, let us assume we will calculate the
transitive closure matrix T from K, K2, and K3 only. Accordingly, to calculate
entry T52 for example, we would do the following:
T52 = K52 ∪K252 ∪K352
= 0 ∪ 0.18 ∪ 0.048
= (0 + 0.18− 0 ∗ 0.18) ∪ 0.048
= 0.18 + 0.048− 0.18 ∗ 0.048
= 0.21936
≈ 0.22
Tij gives the probability that an error or failure in i causes a failure in j through
a path of any length. Following equation 5.2, the matrix T below, rounded to two
decimal places for presentation purposes, is the transitive closure of the given matrix
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K. For example, T52 = 0.22 means that if node 5 has a failure, there is a 22% chance
that this failure will propagate to node 2.
T =

0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.5 0.36 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.6 0.92 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.12 0.22 0.0 0.2 0.0

Using the fault proneness, fi, and the transitive closure, Tij, we can compute
Rij, the probability that node i could be the root cause of a failure in node j, as
follows:
Rij = fiTij (5.3)
This calculates the probability that node i had a fault that propagated, directly
or indirectly, to cause a failure in j. Therefore, the term Rij gives us the probability
that a failure in j has i as its root cause. The fault proneness of each node in










According to Equation 5.3, R would have the following probabilities, rounded
to two decimal places for presentation purposes:
R =

0.0 0.16 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.05 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.18 0.28 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.02 0.04 0.0 0.04 0.0

From the above matrix, R42 = 0.28 means there is a 28% chance that node 4 is
the root cause of an incident in node 2.
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5.3 Step 2: Producing the Current Root Cause
Matrix
In step 1, we produced a root cause matrix based on the relations in the CMDB
and other information such as incident reports. However, one such static view of
the system may not always yield accurate results if certain aspects change from
one point in time to another. Therefore, we take the calendar information of the
system into consideration while performing root cause analysis. For example, if a
backup process runs every night at 8:00 pm to backup a database server, then the
relationship between the backup process and the database server only exists at that
time. Such information should be considered to produce more accurate analysis.
Depending on the time of the incident being examined, we will adjust our root
cause matrix according to the calendar information available. Using the example
in Figure 5.3, if the backup process (node 5) only takes place on Wednesdays from
7:00 - 8:00 pm, then the edge from node 5 to node 4 will only exist at that time.
Accordingly, if we receive an incident on Sunday at 2:00 pm, we look at our calendar
information and check if there are any causality edges we can exclude to improve
the analysis. In this case, we can exclude the edge from node 5 to node 4 since this
relationship does not exist on Sunday at 2:00 pm.
After examining the calendar information, we exclude irrelevant edges according
to the time of the incident which means that our causality matrix K will change.
We then calculate a new current root cause matrix according to the new edges
being considered. To calculate the current root cause matrix, we follow the calcu-
lations done in step 1c. For example, given the scenario mentioned in the previous
paragraph, the current root cause matrix would be as follows:
Rcurrent =

0.0 0.16 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.05 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.18 0.28 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

If no calendar information is available for the system, then we simply use the
root cause matrix calculated in step 1 as our main matrix for all times. In practice,
we can skip generating the root cause matrix in step 1c, and simply generate it as
needed in step 2.
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CI Last Change Weight
1 January 1, 2009 10:00 am 0.00001
3 May 4, 2009 10:00 am 0.94
4 April 30, 2009 2:00 pm 0.09
Table 5.2: Temporal Weights
5.4 Step 3: Producing the Current Weighted Root
Cause Matrix
After calculating the current root cause matrix in step 2 by considering the time
of the incident and the available calendar information, we still need to consider the
events and changes that actually happened in the system before the incident. This
follows from the idea that if X causes some incident in Y , X has to occur before
Y . Additionally, the fault or failure in X should occur at a time that is reasonably
close to the time of the incident in Y . For example, it is more likely that a change
or event that happened 2 hours before the incident occurred could be its root cause
versus some other event that happened two days ago.
To do this, we compare the time of the incident and the time of the last change
that occurred to related CIs such that a higher weight is given to CIs that had
events or changes that took place closer to the time of the incident. A weighting
scheme is needed to accomplish this. The choice of the weighting scheme does not
affect the rest of the calculations we do. The main idea is to give decreasing weights
to changes or events as they occur further back from the time of the incident. We
choose to use an exponentially decaying weighting scheme from 1.0 to 0.0. The rate
of decay, however, depends on the nature of the system. The exponential weighting
scheme we use in this example is shown in Figure 5.4.
According to when the last time a CI changed or an event associated with it
occurred, its row in the root cause matrix, R, would be multiplied by its temporal
weight. Accordingly, CIs which have not changed in a long time will have a very
low weight factor (almost 0) which will greatly decrease their probability to be a
suspect root cause of the current incident.
Assume we have received an incident for CI 2 on Monday May 4, 2009 at 2:00
pm. Table 5.2 shows the different change times of the CIs, and their temporal
weight according to the weighting scale shown in Figure 5.4. For example, since
the last change in CI 4 happened on April 30, 2009 at 2 pm (i.e., 96 hours from
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Figure 5.4: Weighting Scale
the time of the current incident), its weight will be 0.09 according to the graph in
Figure 5.4.
We then multiply the temporal weight of each CI by its corresponding row in
the root cause matrix R to get the new probabilities. Accordingly, the probabilities
shown in Rcurrent in Step 2 (See page 39) will now change to those in Rweighted.
These are shown below, rounded to three decimal places for presentation purposes.
Note that since the incident occurred on a Monday, the edge from node 5 to node
4 is not considered as this edge only exists on Wednesdays from 7:00 - 8:00 pm as
shown in Step 2. That is why all the entries in row 5 are zeros in Rweighted, and we
do not need to worry about the changes done to CI 5.
Rweighted =

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.047 0.034 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.016 0.025 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Since the incident is in CI 2, we look at column 2 in the root cause matrix to
determine the ranking of the suspect CIs. Without temporal information, our most
likely suspect for the incident in CI 2 was CI 4 (with a 28% chance) followed by
CI 1 (with a 16% chance) as shown in matrix Rcurrent from step 2 (See page 39).
With temporal information, our primary suspect now becomes CI 3 (with a 3.4%
chance) followed by CI 4 (with a 2.5% chance) as shown in matrix Rweighted above.




As with any model or framework, the accuracy of the produced results is a function
of the quality of the data available. The more detailed the information stored
about incidents, their root causes, and side effects, the more accurate the estimated
probabilities are likely to be, and thus the more accurate the root cause analysis will
be. Since ITIL standards are becoming increasingly popular and are being adopted
by organizations, we believe that in time more companies will adhere to these
standards and have detailed documentation of their incidents. Additionally, as the
need arises, the structure of the reports may eventually change to include more
information that will be useful to future root cause and change impact analysis.
In order to have an effective prediction framework, learning from the results
of previous analyses is crucial. When an incident is reported, and the framework
reports a suspected root cause, this suspect CI should be fixed, and then the prob-
lem should be re-evaluated to determine if it has been resolved or not. Whether
the problem was fixed or not, and accordingly, whether the identified root cause
was accurate or not should be stored in the incident reports. The causality graph
should be updated at regular intervals with the new information mined from these
incident reports.
As incidents occur and are fixed, the totality of the picture may change, and the
strength of the causality edges may change accordingly. The frequency with which
the causality graph is updated depends on the nature of the system at hand. If the
system being managed is a highly dynamic system with many incidents occurring, a
higher frequency of updating is needed. On the other hand, if the rate of incidents
is low, the initial causality graph will be more or less stable, and a lower frequency
of updating is needed.
One of the challenges of using a causality graph is how to deal with cycles in
the causality graph. Practically, a cycle implies that an error in a particular CI
could cause a ripple of failures which loop around and cause another failure in the
original CI, repeatedly. This implies that the loop can be traversed many times.
Although we chose not to address loops yet, as they are not very common in real
systems, and most work in the field has chosen to ignore them, our model does,
however, allow for them. Using matrix multiplication to calculate the transitive
closure can approximate the impact of loops.
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we demonstrated how the data in the CMDB can be mined to
produce a causality graph, and how this graph can be represented in a matrix.
Through manipulations on this matrix, we produced a root cause matrix which
records the probability that one CI is the root cause of an incident in another CI.
This is done through three steps: forming the basic root cause matrix from the
data in the CMDB, considering the time of the reported incident along with the
system’s calendar information to adjust the current root cause matrix accordingly,
and finally using different weights for different CIs according to the last time they
have changed to produce the final root cause matrix. The final root cause matrix






This chapter presents the second process supported by our framework: change
impact analysis. It explains the collaborative process involved between the analyst
and DRACA, and describes the model used in this process. We also present the
empirical work done to evaluate our change impact analysis process.
Section 6.1 presents the sources of data needed to populate the presented model.
Section 6.2 explains the change impact analysis process provided by DRACA. Sec-
tion 6.3 explains how DRACA’s performance will be evaluated. Section 6.4 explains
the underlying model DRACA uses for suggesting CIs. Section 6.5 presents the em-
pirical work performed to evaluate DRACA. It explains the structure of the data
used, the experiment setup, as well as the results obtained from the base case of
our experiment and those from the various filtering techniques we used.
6.1 Data Needed for Change Impact Analysis
If the analyst determines that CI x is in a new change set, our method essentially
searches for previous change sets, stored in the CMDB, that contain x, and suggests
that CIs in those sets (appropriately ranked) should be considered for inclusion in
the new change set. Our model uses support and confidence measures to estimate
how closely related nodes x and y are, based on how often they have appeared
together in past change sets. To be able to calculate the support and confidence
measures, we need to have the following information available:
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Figure 6.1: Flowchart of DRACA’s Interactive Change Impact Analysis Process
• Change Orders: Change orders must record the change set involved (i.e.,
the set of CIs that were changed in this change order) as well as the date this
change was implemented on.
Our current change impact analysis method relies only on historical co-change.
Since historical co-change can be mined out of the change sets stored in change
orders, we do not need additional sources of information for our current approach.
In the future, as we use more information for our analysis, more data sources might
need to be used.
6.2 DRACA’s Change Impact Analysis Process
The change impact analysis process that we propose is a collaborative interaction
between the analyst and the DRACA tool as illustrated in Figure 6.1. Figure 6.2
shows the Graphical User Interface (GUI) for our prototype supporting this process.
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Figure 6.2: The DRACA Prototype Tool Suggests a List of Ranked CIs to the
Analyst, and Allows her to Ask for More Suggestions Based on the CIs she Accepts
This process consists of five main steps as shown in both figures. In step 1, the
analyst provides DRACA with the CI she wants to change (the initial CI). In our
prototype tool, she enters the name into the ‘CI Name’ text box. In step 2, the
analyst clicks the ‘Suggest CIs’ button which triggers DRACA to check its model
to search for CIs that have previously changed with the initial CI.
If DRACA has no suggestions to make to the analyst (e.g., the indicated CI
has not previously changed with any other CIs in DRACA’s stored model), then
this ends the process of interaction between DRACA and the analyst. However, if
DRACA has suggestions to make, it moves to step 3 and provides the analyst with
a list of ranked CIs. These CIs are displayed in the ‘Suggested CIs (Ranked)’ table,
and are color coded according to their ranking (red, blue, and green).
The analyst, in step 4, then chooses the CIs to include in her change set. The
information provided by DRACA in terms of support and confidence guide the
analyst to choose the CIs to accept. The accepted CIs (along with the initial CI
the analyst provided) form the change set that is being constructed. To accept any
of the suggested CIs in Figure 6.2, the analyst highlights the CI(s) she wants to
accept, and clicks on ‘Accept’. This moves the selected CIs to the ‘Accepted CIs’
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table.
At this point, in step 5, the analyst may ask DRACA to make more suggestions
based on the new CIs she added to the change set through the ‘Suggest More’
button, or she may choose to end the interaction with DRACA through the ‘Done’
button. If she asks DRACA for more suggestions, then for each newly accepted
CI, DRACA searches for other CIs that have changed with it and suggests them to
the analyst. DRACA will not, however, suggest any CIs that have been previously
suggested. This process continues until either DRACA has no more suggestions to
make or the analyst decides not to ask DRACA for more suggestions, and clicks
‘Done’. Once this process is over, the analyst’s interaction with DRACA ends.
If there are CIs that the analyst wants to add to the change set, and which
DRACA has missed, the analyst is free to add these CIs to the change set. If
this situation occurs, then DRACA was not able to suggest all CIs relevant to the
analyst. However, if the analyst does not add any extra CIs after its interaction
with DRACA is over, then DRACA found all the relevant CIs. After the analyst
chooses the change set, she finalizes the change order which will be stored in the
CMDB repository. This means that in future analyses, the model would be updated
to include this newly created change set.
Additionally, the DRACA prototype tool gives the analyst the flexibility of
choosing different filters for the list of returned CIs as shown in Figure 6.1. Sec-
tions 6.4 and 6.5 explain a few of the possible filters to use. These include a support
threshold and a confidence threshold. We also allow the analyst to control the num-
ber of suggested CIs. Depending on the nature of the system, the DRACA tool will
be set up with default thresholds that guarantee the best performance of the tool.
This is convenient for novice analysts that are still not familiar with the system.
On the other hand, more experienced analysts can change these settings to vary
the list of returned CIs according to their need.
6.3 Measuring the Performance of DRACA
We need a way to evaluate DRACA’s suggested CIs. Ideally, DRACA would suggest
all the CIs in the change set without making any errors, but of course this does not
often happen in practice. The recall and precision measures from the information
retrieval field are appropriate for this type of evaluation. Recall measures the
proportion of correct CIs retrieved by the system, while precision measures the
proportion of suggested CIs that are correct [34].
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The Change Set is the set of CIs that need to be considered for a change to be
complete. We define the Predicted Set (P) as the set of all CIs DRACA suggests
through the full iteration process (see Figure 6.1). We define the Occurred Set (O)
as the CIs remaining in the change set after excluding the Initial CI provided by
the analyst (i.e Change Set - Initial CI). The intersection of the predicted set and
the occurred set, called PO, is the common CIs in both sets. For each constructed
change set, we then calculate the recall and precision values for the predictions









If no CIs are predicted (i.e P and thus PO is empty), precision is defined as 1
since there cannot exist any incorrect predictions in an empty predicted set. On
the other hand, if the size of the change set is 1, and thus the size of the occurred
set is 0, recall is defined as 1 since there are no CIs to predict.
In order to have a single measure that indicates the effectiveness of our pre-
dictions, we use the F-measure which is based on van Rijsbergen’s effectiveness
measure which combines recall and precision [34]. The F-measure is calculated
according to Equation 6.3 which gives equal weighting to recall and precision.
F = 2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision+ recall
(6.3)
The ideal F-measure is 1 where both recall and precision are 1. The F-measure
accounts for undesirable situations with very low recall and high precision (or vice
versa) by producing a low value. For example, if recall = 0.9 and precision = 0.1,
the F-measure would be 0.18. On the other hand, if the recall and precision values
were closer to the mid-range, for example, recall = 0.5 and precision = 0.7, the
F-measure would be higher, around 0.58.
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Figure 6.3: Tracking Changes between CIs
6.4 Model Used
In order to keep track of which CIs changed together in the past, we need a model
that gives an indication of CIs which change together frequently versus those which
do not. To accomplish this, we use two measures, support and confidence, from
Zimmermann et al. [40].
Given a historical sequence of change sets, we start by counting the number
of times each pair of entities (CIs in our case) appeared in a change order. For
example, Figure 6.3 records that CIs B and C have occurred together in 4 change
sets. We call this count the support between these two CIs. The support is drawn
as an undirected edge between the two CIs. These counts are stored in the support





A 5 5 0
B 5 10 4
C 0 4 8

An entry Sij shows how many times i and j changed together during the time
period we are mining. For example, since A and B changed 5 times together, entry
SAB = 5. Note that Sii is the number of times i changed with itself which is simply
the count of how many times i changed in total. Also note that the support matrix
is symmetrical since the number of times A and B changed together is the same as
the number of times B and A changed together.
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The support matrix S records the actual counts of co-changes. However, it
is also useful to compute relative counts which take into consideration the total
number of times each of these CIs have changed. For example, in Figure 6.3, A and
B have changed 5 times together while the total number of times A and B have
each changed are 5 and 10 respectively. This means that every time A changed, B
changed with it as well while every time B changed, A changed with it only half









This means that 50% of the time that B appeared in a change set, A also
appeared in the same change set. The confidence matrix C for the example in





A 1.0 1.0 0
B 0.5 1.0 0.4
C 0 0.5 1.0

6.5 Empirical Validation
To provide empirical results, we simulated the process described in Section 6.2 on
a set of industrial data. We use the model presented in Section 6.4 to make the
suggestions. We propose an initial procedure, our base case, and then propose three
improved procedures which ideally filter out items mistakenly predicted by the base
case. To evaluate these procedures, we test them with data from three year’s use of
a CMDB at CA. This section describes the data used, the experiment setup, and
the results obtained.
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Average Num of COs Per Month 758
Total Number of COs Studied 27,305
Table 6.1: Number of Change Orders (COs) Studied in the GIS System
6.5.1 Description of the Data
Size of the System
The set of industrial data we used to evaluate our technique was provided by CA’s
Global Information Systems (GIS) team. Internally, CA uses its own Service Desk
and CMDB products to manage its internal network and the services it provides to
internal or external customers. The GIS team manages the CA network worldwide.
In a change order, the set of CIs to be changed (i.e., the change set) is stored in
a field named, ‘Configuration Items’. However, some of the change orders in the
CMDB had this field empty as they were not related to any CI. For example, some
changes were more business or logistics related where an employee was changing
their seat allocation or was requesting a new software on their laptop etc. In our
work, we only considered IT related changes, and excluded change orders with
empty change sets. Table 6.1 shows the number of change orders containing data
in the ‘Configuration Items’ field per year in the GIS Service Desk during the three
year period, January 2006 – December 2008, examined in this work.
From the three years of data, we determined the following facts about changes
in the system. The average size of a change set is 4 CIs. At the end of 2008,
there was a total of 37,906 CIs in the system. However, over the examined three
year period, only 7,999 CIs were involved in the change reports (about 21% of the
total number of CIs). The fact that not all the CIs have changes associated with
them is not surprising since the CMDB keeps track of a large variety of CI types.
These types range from software applications to hardware such as printers or LCD
screens whose changes would not necessarily be logged in the CMDB. However,
change orders are usually logged for business critical components that affect the
services provided by the company.
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Format of the Change Order Reports
In the CMDB, a Change Order has several fields including the requester, the as-
signee, the start date of the change, the description and the change set field (called
the ‘Configuration Items’ field). Of the fields in a change order, we use only the
change set field. The advantage of only using this one field is that change sets are
easy to extract and easy to understand and, more importantly, as we will show,
they may be useful as the basis for predicting future change sets.
6.5.2 Experiment Setup
To apply the change impact analysis process described in Section 6.2, we mined the
change orders stored in the CMDB repository to extract the change sets. We use
reports from three consecutive years: 2006, 2007 and 2008. We start by constructing
the support and confidence matrices from January 2006, and use this knowledge
to predict the change sets in February 2006 (i.e., learning period = Jan 2006 and
testing period = Feb 2006). We then add the data from February 2006 to our
matrices, and attempt to predict the change sets in March 2006 (i.e. learning period
= Jan-Feb 2006 and testing period = March 2006), and so on until December 2008.
For each learning period, we calculate the support matrix and then calculate
the confidence matrix according to Equation 6.4. To calculate the support matrix,
S, we look at each change order in the specified learning date range, and increment
the count of each CI that occurred in this change order as well as incrementing the
count corresponding to each pair of CIs in the change order. That is, if a change
order has CIs A and B, then SAA, SBB, SAB, and SBA are all incremented.
For each testing period, the aim is to use data (support and confidence matrices)
from the corresponding learning period to try to reproduce the existing change sets
given an initial CI in the set. Using the available data in this way assumes that
the actual data available to us accurately reflects the ideal change set for a given
change. This technique is commonly used in evaluating research ideas, such as the
work done by Hassan and Holt [15] as well as that by Zimmermann et al. [42], when
deploying the tool in a production system is not feasible. For each change in the
testing period, we choose one of the CIs in its change set (Initial CI), and then
suggest which other CIs should be changed along with it. To be able to compare
results from the different filters we use, we fixed the Initial CI to be the first CI
listed in a change set. We then suggest a list of CIs that should also be changed
based on their corresponding values in the matrices.
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To simulate the interaction of the analyst with DRACA, we check which of these
suggestions actually exists in the occurred set. Any suggested CI that happens to
also exist in the occurred set will be treated as accepted by the analyst. For each
accepted CI, DRACA looks for more suggestions. This process continues until no
more accepted CIs can be found, or no more suggestions can be found.
For example, consider this change set: {x, y, z, w}. In this example, the initial
CI would be x making the occurred set O = {y, z, w}. Given x, assume DRACA
suggests the following set of CIs: {y, r, w}. Since y and w are part of the occurred
set, DRACA looks for more suggestions given that y and w are accepted. Assume
DRACA now suggests {l,m}. Since none of the suggested CIs are in the occurred
set, DRACA stops iterating making the predicted set, P = {y, r, w, l,m}. The
intersection set would be PO = {y, w}. We can now compute recall and precision
based on the sizes of sets: occurred |O| = 3, predicted |P | = 5 and intersection















An experiment run consists of reproducing all the change sets from February
2006 to December 2008. For each experiment run, we calculate the average recall
and precision values from all the change sets in the testing periods. However, to
allow time for the learning process to stabilize, we exclude the first five testing
periods, and calculate the average recall and precision for the change sets in July
2006 to December 2008. The F-measure for each experiment run is then calculated
based on these average recall and precision values.
6.5.3 Experimental Results
We ran the above procedure on our three year dataset. We will first present the
results from applying this procedure to a base case, which suggests each CI that
has occurred in the past with a CI accepted by the analyst. We then present the
results from running the procedure while applying three filtering techniques each
of which remove some of the suggestions made in the base case. These techniques
apply a support threshold, a confidence threshold, and exponential forgetting. We
compare the performance of each of these filters to the base case.
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Base Case
The base case begins by determining which items have occurred together in a change
set in the past. It then predicts members of a change set as follows. When an item
x is known to be in the current set (as determined by an analyst), the base case
suggests each item y which has previously occurred in a change set with x. That
is, Sxy is greater than zero. For example, using the support matrix in Section 6.4,
given that CI B is in the change set, DRACA would also suggest A and C since
they have non-zero entries in the support matrix.
This approach is simple and seems to be promising. When we ran our exper-
imental procedure on this approach, it produced a recall of 0.9423. However its
precision was only 0.0983, which is so low as to be of doubtful utility. This pro-
duces an F-measure of 0.178. We conclude that the base case makes too many
suggestions, thereby producing high recall but too low precision. Consequently, we
proceed to apply filters to prune out some of the base case’s suggestions, hoping to
gain precision at, ideally, a reasonable cost in decreased recall.
Filter 1: Support Threshold
We use the support matrix to count how many times each pair of CIs changed
together. We use these counts as our first filter to refine the base case as follows.
When an item x is known to be in the change set (as determined by an analyst),
Filter 1 suggests each item y which has previously occurred in a change set with x
more than t times, where t is a parameter called the support threshold. Otherwise,
y is not suggested. This is based on the hypothesis that two CIs which have changed
together 10 times in the past is stronger evidence that they may change together
in the future when compared to two CIs that have changed only 5 times together
in the past, for example. Our expectation is that such a threshold will eliminate
enough suggested CIs to increase precision and thereby to improve upon the base
case. Table 6.2 shows the effect of varying the support threshold. The graph in
Figure 6.4 shows the plot of these results.
Higher thresholds prune out more suggestions that would have been made by
the base case. If the threshold is zero, no pruning takes place and this procedure
devolves to the base case; this can be seen in the first row of Table 6.2. As can be
seen, as the support threshold increases, the precision increases with an accompa-
nying decrease in recall. This, in turn, causes the F-measure to improve to about
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Support Threshold Recall Precision F-measure
0 (Base Case) 0.9423 0.0983 0.1780
10 0.7973 0.4674 0.5893
20 0.7488 0.6679 0.7061
30 0.7215 0.7572 0.7389
40 0.7032 0.7925 0.7452
50 0.6900 0.8307 0.7539
60 0.6793 0.8706 0.7635
70 0.6709 0.8866 0.7638
80 0.6627 0.8995 0.7635
90 0.6558 0.9095 0.7621
100 0.650 0.9208 0.7621
110 0.6451 0.9295 0.7616
Table 6.2: Recall/Precision/F-measure with Increasing Support Thresholds (Filter
1)
Figure 6.4: Recall/Precision/F-measure with Increasing Support Thresholds (Filter
1)
0.76 at a threshold of about 70, and then starts decreasing. At that point the recall
is about 67% and the precision is about 89%.
Although these values seem to indicate that this filter is potentially useful in
practice, in fact it cannot be expected to continue to work well. This is because
the counts of pair occurrences (i.e., support) continues to grow with time, while the
support threshold remains constant. Eventually a problem will arise, in that the
increasing support counts will allow more and more suggestions, so precision will
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Confidence Threshold Recall Precision F-measure
0 (Base Case) 0.942 0.098 0.178
0.1 0.924 0.320 0.476
0.2 0.899 0.399 0.552
0.3 0.872 0.476 0.616
0.4 0.850 0.529 0.652
0.5 0.816 0.625 0.707
0.6 0.791 0.682 0.732
0.7 0.753 0.768 0.760
0.8 0.718 0.837 0.773
0.82 0.712 0.850 0.775
0.84 0.710 0.857 0.776
0.86 0.695 0.887 0.779
0.88 0.678 0.899 0.773
0.9 0.666 0.914 0.770
0.92 0.658 0.924 0.769
0.94 0.650 0.932 0.766
0.96 0.644 0.938 0.764
0.98 0.638 0.942 0.761
1.0 0.594 1 0.745
Table 6.3: Recall/Precision/F-measure with Increasing Confidence Thresholds (Fil-
ter 2)
be degraded.
Filter 2: Confidence Threshold
Filter 1 improved the F-measure of our predictions, but it, unfortunately, depends
on the length of time the system has been running. The second filter (confidence
threshold) is much like the first filter but avoids this problem by using relative
counts. When an item x is known to be in the change set (as determined by an
analyst), this procedure suggests each item y such that y′s confidence with respect
to x is greater than u (i.e., Cxy > u), where u is called the confidence threshold.
To illustrate how Filter 2 works, consider the example confidence matrix we
presented earlier (see Page 51) in which CBA = 0.5 and CBC = 0.4. If B is known
to be in a change set, and if the confidence threshold is 0.2, then both A and C
57
Figure 6.5: Recall/Precision/F-measure with Increasing Confidence Thresholds
(Filter 2)
will be suggested as likely members of the change set because both CBA and CBC
exceed 0.2. However, if the confidence threshold is 0.45, only A will be suggested.
Table 6.3 shows the effect of varying the confidence threshold on the recall and
precision levels, and accordingly on the F-measure. Figure 6.5 shows the plot of
these results. As in the case of the previous filter (support threshold), larger values
of the threshold prune out more of the suggestions that would have been made by
the base case. Similarly, if the threshold u is zero, this procedure devolves to the
base case; this can be seen in the first row of Table 6.3.
The table and figure show that as the confidence threshold is raised, the F-
measure keeps improving until a threshold of about 0.8 is reached and then starts
falling. To find a more exact value for which the F-measure maximizes, we tested
all confidence thresholds form 0.8 - 1.0 in intervals of 0.02. This showed that the
F-measure reached a maximum value of 0.779 at a threshold of about 0.86, and then
started falling. At that maximum value, recall was about 70% and precision was
about 89%. These values are somewhat better than those from the previous filter,
but more important is the expectation that this second filter will keep producing
good recall and precision with the passage of time. These high values indicate that
this filter is potentially useful in practice.
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Half-life Recall Precision F-measure
3 months 0.7074 0.8623 0.7772
6 months 0.6987 0.8782 0.7782
9 months 0.6982 0.8828 0.7798
12 months 0.6980 0.8847 0.7803
15 months 0.6965 0.8858 0.7798
18 months 0.7176 0.8453 0.7763
21 months 0.6961 0.8867 0.7799
24 months 0.6960 0.8868 0.7799
27 months 0.6965 0.8858 0.7798
30 months 0.6960 0.8868 0.7799
33 months 0.6959 0.8869 0.7799
36 months 0.6959 0.8869 0.7799
∞ 0.6945 0.8869 0.7790
Table 6.4: Recall/Precision/F-measure withe a Confidence Threshold of 0.86 and
Increasing Half-life, λ (Filter 3)
Filter 3: Exponential Forgetting
Our third filter is based on the idea that more recent information should count for
more. Since we are dealing with dynamic systems, the relationship between CIs
may change over time or the way they depend on each other may change. There-
fore, more recent change sets should reflect the current state of the system better
than change sets that took place a year ago, for example. When applying expo-
nential forgetting, we use the concept of half-life to indicate how fast the forgetting
occurs. The half-life measures after how much time will we only remember half the
amount of any information. This determines the rate at which we forget previous
information. A shorter half-life means quicker forgetting of information, while a
longer half-life means retaining any learned information for a longer period of time.
As previously explained, in order to calculate the support matrix, we count the
number of times CIs appear in the change reports. If no exponential forgetting is
used, then every time a CI appears in a change report, we increment its count by 1
regardless of the time this change occurred at. Let us call the amount we increment
by, in this case 1, the impact, I, of the new piece of information. With exponential
forgetting, the impact of a new piece of information will depend on the current time
and on the time this piece of information occurred at. Given the half life, λ, we
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Figure 6.6: Recall/Precision/F-measure with a Confidence Threshold of 0.86 and
Increasing Half-life, λ (Filter 3)
use the following formula to calculate the impact, It0 at the present time tnow of a




For simplicity, in our work, we update the support and confidence matrices
every month. Therefore, when predicting the change sets for April for example, we
assume that t0 is March 31st. The impact of the data learned from previous months
in the support and confidence matrices is adjusted accordingly. After we are done
predicting the change sets in April, the new t0 time becomes April 30th, and we
add the change sets in April to our matrices, and adjust their impact accordingly.
Before applying exponential forgetting, we filter using our best results from
Filters 1 and 2. This is done by applying Filter 2 (which produced better results
than Filter 1) with its confidence threshold set to 0.86 (the best setting of that
threshold). Table 6.4 and Figure 6.6 show the results of exponential forgetting
with that threshold active.
As shown, varying the half-life only slightly improved results. The best half-life
seems to be 12 months with an F-measure of 0.7803.
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6.5.4 Discussion of Results
The obtained results seems promising since they indicate that the change set data is
highly predictive, with high values of recall and precision. However, a question that
arose during these experiments is this: Why are the values of recall, precision and
the F-measure so high? These values are higher than figures from experiments such
as predicting change sets in source code updating [15, 42, 37]. This question became
more intriguing with the bottom row of Table 6.3 which documents the situation
when the confidence threshold is 1.0. This threshold implies that the procedure will
make absolutely no suggestions. In other words, the procedure will predict that the
change set contains nothing but the item originally provided by the analyst. As
the table shows, with this threshold, the F-measure (0.745) is reasonably high.
Both the high recall (0.594) and high precision (1.0) contribute to this high
F-measure. The perfect precision can be explained as follows. Since precision mea-
sures the percentage of suggestions made that were correct, making no suggestions
at all means making no mistakes at all which produces a perfect precision of 1.0.
This maximal possible value of precision helps make the F-measure be high.
However, it was the corresponding high recall value that came as a surprise.
Achieving perfect precision is usually accompanied by a very low recall rate, but
this was not what we observed. The corresponding observed high recall value
(0.594) has the following explanation. In the analyzed data, we found out that
16,294 change orders out of the total of 27,305 change orders studied contained
only 1 CI in their change set. This means that roughly 59% of the change sets
in the data contain exactly one CI. Each such CI will be selected by the analyst
as the initial CI leaving the occurred set empty. This means that the occurred
set is empty about 59% of the time. If the occurred set is empty, recall is 1.0 by
definition [15]. However, if the occurred set is not empty, and no suggestions are
made, then recall is 0. Since 59% of the change sets have empty occurred sets, it
follows that the average recall of all change sets is about 59% in the case in which
the procedure makes no suggestions.
In our experiment, we determined that a value of 0.86 for the confidence thresh-
old u produces the maximum F-measure value (0.779). We interpret this as follows.
This u value (0.86) is close enough to 1.0 so it suggests no CIs most of the time
which is correct for change sets of size 1. Additionally, when it does make sugges-
tions, it suggests only high frequency pairs that have a high chance of being correct.
This explains why the experiment has such simultaneous high recall and precision
results.
61
Figure 6.7: Comparing Recall and Precision for Filter 1 (Support Threshold) and
Filter 2 (Confidence Threshold)
One interpretation of this situation is as follows. Filter 2 learned to perform well
(as shown by its recall, precision and F-measure values) and it accomplished this
by making no suggestions in many cases. Another interpretation would question
the convention of defining precision to be 1.0 in the case of an empty suggestion set
as this definition seems to inflate the value of precision. Another interpretation or
approach would ignore all singleton change sets and would re-run the experiments
using only change sets of size at least two. We favor the first interpretation, but
recognize that the other interpretations have merit. Regardless of the interpreta-
tion, it appears that Filter 2 may adapt reasonably well to other historical data
of change sets that either do or do not contain many singleton change sets; future
work may confirm this position.
Figure 6.7 compares the recall-precision curves of the first two filters. These
curves are based on the precision and recall columns of Tables 6.2 and 6.3. The top
left point of these two curves corresponds to the base case. As the figure shows,
the curve for Filter 1 (support threshold) lies below that of Filter 2 (confidence
threshold). This indicates that in all cases Filter 2 outperformed Filter 1. Since
Filter 2 produced the best results in our experiments, we used confidence to rank
the set of suggested CIs that are displayed to the analyst.
Applying exponential forgetting with the optimal confidence threshold of 0.86
slightly improved results (raising the F-measure from 77.9% to 78.03% with a half
life λ = 12 months). We believe that this is because the nature of the system data
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we analyzed is more or less stable in the sense that once a change set occurs, it
is likely that it will occur again in the future. With a more dynamic system, we
expect that varying the half-life would produce more significant variances in the
results.
6.5.5 Threats to Validity
Although our results seem promising, we still cannot conclude that our findings will
apply to different systems. We presented our results from analysis of one system,
which is the system used by CA’s GIS team. We reviewed one other system, but it
did not use change sets so we were not able to apply our technique to it. Ideally, in
the future we may be able to analyze more systems which use change sets, but this
may be challenging as it is not easy to gain access to industrial systems. Analyzing
additional systems would allow us to better evaluate the utility of various filters.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the collaborative change impact analysis process pro-
vided by DRACA. Given an initial CI that is provided by the analyst, DRACA
suggests more CIs that might also be included in the current change set. Based
on the CIs an analyst accepts in the change set, DRACA could suggest additional
CIs. All the lists of suggested CIs are ranked according to their confidence measure.
The support and confidence measures are used to model the strength of correlation
between two CIs according to their co-change history.
We tested our process on a set of industrial data. By applying different filters
on the suggested CIs, we were able to predict change sets with a combination of
recall and precision as high as 69.8% and 88.5% respectively. The filters applied
include a support threshold, a confidence threshold and exponential forgetting. The






7.1 Summary of Topics Addressed
Enterprise IT management (EITM) is becoming increasingly important every day
since most business services are delivered through an underlying IT infrastructure.
Since any failure in the IT infrastructure results in financial losses for the business,
properly managing an IT system is crucial. The Information Technology Infras-
tructure Library (ITIL) provides guidelines to processes and tools that can be used
for EITM. A Configuration Management Database (CMDB) is one of these tools.
A CMDB provides a basis for Configuration Management by tracking configuration
items (CIs) and the relationships which in turn provides a basis for Change Man-
agement. Change Management involves controlling changes applied to the system.
This includes change impact analysis which identifies all the CIs that need to be
updated for a change to be correctly implemented. Configuration Management also
provides a basis for root cause analysis since it provides the relationships between
CIs which allows the propagation of problems to be tracked. Root cause analysis
involves finding the ultimate cause of a problem accurately and efficiently. This
allows analysts to spend less time on finding the cause of the problem, and more
time to solving the problem resulting in a shorter mean time to recovery. This the-
sis addresses the challenges involved in providing useful decision support for root
cause analysis and change impact analysis.
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7.2 Summary of DRACA’s Approach
This thesis presented DRACA, a Decision-support framework for Root cause Anal-
ysis and Change impact Analysis. In DRACA, root cause analysis is supported
by a causality graph which is constructed from data mined out of the CMDB. We
demonstrated how the data in the CMDB can be mined to produce a causality
graph, and how this graph can be represented in a matrix. Through manipulations
on this matrix, we produced a root cause matrix which records the probability that
one CI is the root cause of an incident in another CI. This is done through three
steps. The first steps produces the basic root cause matrix from the data in the
CMDB. The second step considers the time of the reported incident along with the
system’s calendar information to adjust the current root cause matrix accordingly.
The third step then assigns different weights for the different CIs according to the
last time they have changed to produce the final root cause matrix. The final root
cause matrix effectively provides a ranked list of the suspect CIs for the current
incident.
To be able to provide decision support for change impact analysis, we used the
hypothesis that CIs that have change together frequently in the past are likely to
change again together in the future. Through mining change sets from the CMDB,
DRACA suggests the CIs that might be included in a change set, and also provides
a ranking of these CIs based on their pattern of recurrence in the past. By modeling
this recurrence in support and confidence matrices, and by applying different filters,
we were able to predict change sets with a combination of recall and precision as
high as 69.8% and 88.5% respectively. We presented the effect of different filters we
applied to the suggested set of CIs. These include a support threshold, a confidence
threshold and exponential forgetting. The confidence threshold seemed to be the
most effective threshold and greatly improved results. Although we mined our data
out of the CMDB repository, this work can be applied on any repository with a
different format as long as change sets are recorded.
7.3 Thesis Contributions
A summary of the contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• An exploration of data repositories (CMDBs) that have not been previously
attempted in the mining software repositories research community.
66
• A causality model providing decision support for root cause analysis based
on this mined data.
• A process for mining historical change information to suggest CIs for future
change sets based on a ranking model. Support and confidence measures were
used to make the suggestions.
• Empirical results from applying the proposed change impact analysis process
to industrial data. Our results show that the change sets in the CMDB were
highly predictive, and that with a confidence threshold of 80% and a half
life of 12 months, an overall recall of 69.8% and a precision of 88.5% were
achieved.
• An overview of lessons learned from using a CMDB, and the observations we
made while working with the CMDB.
7.4 Future Work
There are some enhancements that could be added to DRACA’s functionality to
make it more useful in EITM. Additionally, more empirical studies could be per-
formed to evaluate DRACA’s performance. For the purposes of root cause analysis,
we were not able to empirically evaluate our model due to the difficulty of obtaining
suitable data. Obtaining industrial data is a real challenge. One of our future steps
is, therefore, to continue searching for data sets on which we can test our technique.
As another option, we are also considering simulation to test our model. That is,
we will design a small system and store its configuration in the CMDB. We will sim-
ulate faults causing a failure cascade which eventually causes an incident according
to the probabilities stored in our model. We would then use the probabilities in
our model to identify the root causes of these incidents.
Currently, our root cause analysis process can suggest what possible root cause
CIs for an incident, but cannot indicate how the failure chain occurs. That is if
A had a fault which caused B to fail which subsequently caused C to fail, then
DRACA would report A as a possible root cause to the incident in C. However,
it does not currently present the possible cause-effect chain. This feature could be
incorporated in DRACA by analyzing the the timing of all the events in related
CIs to order them chronologically and construct a possible cause-effect scenario.
From the change impact analysis side, we have used simple heuristics to in-
vestigate if the nature of changes stored in a CMDB is predictive or not. Since
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our results seem promising, we intend to expand on this work using more of the
available information. As shown in Section 6.5.1, there are several input fields in
a change order that we might use in the future to derive additional information to
help predict change impact. For example, looking at the description of the change
along with the CIs which changed can allow us to have a classification of the dif-
ferent types of changes, and to predict which CIs to change based on the nature
of the change. Additionally, looking at which analysts perform which changes can
allow us to recommend the best analyst to perform the current change.
We also plan to add more decision support to our tool. For example, DRACA
could not only suggest other CIs to change, but also the best time to implement
this change based on the availability schedule of all CIs involved in the change
set. Additionally, to reduce the probability of a change causing a failure sometime
later in the system, we could bundle change orders with incident reports in the
CMDB to identify which changes induced incidents, similar to the work in [31].
This will increase the cooperation between root cause analysis and change impact
analysis. Finally, we hope to get access to more data sets to be able to compare
the performance of the different filters on systems of different nature.
From the overall perspective of our framework, once we are able to find a dataset
on which we can apply both root cause analysis and change impact analysis, we
would like to test the collaboration between both processes. That is, we could use
the root cause analysis model to validate the change impact analysis model and
vice versa. If a change in x requires a change in y for the change to be successful,
it is very likely that an incident in y might be caused by a change in x.
7.5 Thesis Conclusion
The work presented in this thesis is unique in that it combines different aspects of
root cause analysis and change impact analysis into one framework. The problems
we address are real world challenges which we have learned about from discussions
with CMDB users and CMDB experts. Working closely with CA Labs has given
us an insight into the problems faced by CMDB users. DRACA lays a foundation
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